- Falsely support the null 25% of the time if we set a cutoff of BF10 < 1/3 for supporting the null
- Falsely support the null 12.5% of the time if we set a stricter cutoff of BF10 < 1/10 for supporting the null

` `

`require(BayesFactor) `

```
set.seed(123)
get.BF = function(cohensd, n){
x<-rnorm(n = n, mean = 0, sd = 1) #produce N simulated participants
y<-rnorm(n = n, mean = cohensd, sd = 1) #produce N simulated participants
z<-t.test(x,y) #perform the t-test
BF10<-exp(ttest.tstat(z$statistic,n,n,rscale=sqrt(2)/2)$bf)
BF10
}
simsH0 = replicate(10000, get.BF(cohensd = 0, n = 75))
quantile(simsH0, probs = 0.95)
```

` `

```
## 95%
## 0.9974437
```

Wait… what? It turns out that even if we accept any Bayes factor greater than

**1**as a basis to support H1, we will only reject H0 falsely 5% of the time! That seems bizarre - a Bayes factor of 1, after all, means that the data is just as consistent with H0 as it is with H1! (

**Note**: The cut-off for a 5% error rate differs according to the H1 prior specified and the sample size - don't take the title of this post too literally!)

How about if we used stricter cut-offs of BF10 > 3 (“positive” evidence according to Kass and Raftery, 1995), or > 20 (“strong” evidence)?

` `

```
sum(simsH0 > 3)/length(simsH0)
```

```
## [1] 0.0114
```

```
sum(simsH0 > 20)/length(simsH0)
```

```
## [1] 0.0015
```

It turns out that if we use the BF10 > 3 criterion (which still seems very liberal), our Type 1 error rate is only about 1%. And it we use a rule of BF10 > 20 as a cut-off for supporting H1, our Type 1 error rate becomes absolutely miniscule - about 0.15%.

Weird. But let's follow this exercise to its conclusion… what Type

**2**error rate results if we the BF10 > 1 rule to support H1? Well, presuming Daniel's original effect size of δ = 0.3:

` `

```
simsH1 = replicate(10000, get.BF(cohensd = 0.3, n = 75))
sum(simsH1 > 1)/length(simsH1) #We support H1 46% of the time
```

```
## [1] 0.4621
```

```
power.t.test (75, 0.3) #Which is virtually identical to the power of a frequentist t-test
```

```
##
## Two-sample t test power calculation
##
## n = 75
## delta = 0.3
## sd = 1
## sig.level = 0.05
## power = 0.4463964
## alternative = two.sided
##
## NOTE: n is number in *each* group
```

So, on one level, we have a reassuring result: It is possible to set a Bayes factor cut-off for “decisiveness” that gives us basically the same Type 1 and Type 2 error rates as a conventional significance test. Which makes sense: The Bayes factor is just a monotonic transformation of the p value, after all.

But on the other hand… a lot of this doesn't make a lot of intuitive sense. How can we maintain a low Type 1 error rate with such a liberal cut-off for supporting H1? And why does the same incredibly liberal cut-off

*not*result in particularly good power for supporting H1 when the true effect size is small but definitely not zero?

The answer to this lies in thinking about the models we're actually comparing here. We might think of this test as comparing an hypothesis of an exactly zero effect (H0) to one of a non-zero effect (H1), but that isn't actually what we're doing. The H1 model being tested

__is that the true effect size δ is randomly drawn from a Cauchy distribution with location = 0 and scale = 0.707.__

Now when the true effect size δ is zero, the majority of sample effect sizes we see are indeed near zero. And the null (H0) model tends to fit the resulting sample estimates quite well, as it should (since it's the true model). On the other hand, the H1 model of Cauchy (0, 0.707) is quite spread out: It implies a 50% chance of an effect size |δ| > 0.707. Correspondingly it suggests that sample effect sizes very near zero are quite improbable. So when H0 is true, the H1 model tends not to fit the data well, and we will accidentally support it only very rarely.

But what's the story when the true effect size is δ = 0.3? Why is the Bayes factor test still so shy to support the H1 model, even if the null hypothesis is actually false, and even if we take the slightest sliver of evidence (BF10 > 1) as enough to say H1 is true?

Well, first of all, in this situation

*neither the H0 model nor the H1 model is true*. The H1 model suggests that the true effect size is randomly drawn from a Cauchy distribution, and places zero prior probability on the true effect size taking any specific point value. But here the true effect size is a fixed, small, value. So both models are technically false, but either could sometimes fit the resulting data quite well. And, as it happens, because the H1 model of Cauchy (0, 0.707) suggests that a small true effect size isn't very probable, it tends

*not*to fit very well to data simulated according to a fixed, small, effect size. On the other hand, the null model often fits reasonably well with such data. Hence in this situation we tend to be much more likely to support H0 than H1, even though H0 is false.

In one sense, the result I come up with above is just a statistical curiousity, and one that probably won't be very surprising to people very familiar with Bayes factors. But I think there are some simple philosophy-of-science considerations to keep in mind here that might be of interest to some.

Basically, when we use a Bayes factor test of a null hypothesis test, the H1 model we specify is a falsifiable (but literally false) model that we use as a stand-in for the possibly-true (but unfalsifiable) substantive hypothesis: That the true effect size simply isn't zero. That isn't a fault of the test: No statistical test can make up for the fact that psychological hypotheses are often too vaguely specified to be directly tested without being reformulated. But we need to be wary of over-interpreted a Bayes factor result that supports the null hypothesis: Such a result implies that H0 fits the data better than the specific H1 model we've specified… but it doesn't necessarily mean the null hypothesis is true.